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ABSTRACT: The present Insight offers an analysis of the judgment of the Court of Justice in the so-
called RINA case (judgment of 7 May 2020, case C-641/18, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro 
Navale), which deals with the (non) automatic extension of State immunity to private actors en-
trusted with some public functions. Building on the opinion of AG Spzunar and on the Court of Jus-
tice’ judgment, the Insight argues that the decision will have an impact on the evolution of the law 
on State immunity towards a more limited scope of application. It also constitutes evidence of how 
the EU might contribute with its own practice to this end. 
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I. Introduction 
On the 7th of May the Court of Justice delivered its preliminary ruling in the LG and Oth-
ers v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale case (the RINA case).1 The Court answered to the 
questions presented by the referring court – the District Court of Genoa – on the rela-
tionship between the rules on State immunity and the activities of private corporations 
entrusted by flag States to perform classification and certification of ships. 
The Court of Justice ruled that those corporations do not enjoy immunity from pro-
ceedings before domestic courts because their activities cannot be characterized as an 
expression of public powers akin to that normally exercised by States. 
It appears immediately that the ruling of the Court “might contribute to the devel-
opment of international law in general”, to borrow the words of AG Szpunar, who deliv-
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1 Court of Justice, judgment of 7 May 2020, case C-641/18, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Na-
vale. 
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ered the opinion in the case at hand.2 Indeed, the legal conundrum that the Court was 
asked to untangle was largely related to the extension of State immunity to private ac-
tors delegated to perform public functions. In this regard, the judgment in the RINA 
case adds to a growing case law of the Court of Justice on State immunity, well repre-
sented by the Mahamdia v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria case,3 which tends to 
narrow down the scope of one the most debated rules in international law.4  
For this reason, the present Insight, after a presentation of the facts of the case and 
the questions presented before the Court of Justice (Section II) and an analysis of the 
AG Opinion and of the Court’s ruling (Section III), focuses on the international law issues 
arising from the case (Section IV) and offers a look at possible future implications of the 
judgment (Section V). 
II. Framing the request for the preliminary ruling 
The preliminary ruling in the RINA case originates in the context of a dispute before the 
District Court of Genoa (Italy) initiated by the requests for reparation brought by the 
relatives of the victims of the sinking of the ship Al-Salaam Boccaccio ’98 against the 
companies Rina Spa, Ente Registro Navale (RINA companies) that have their seat in Gen-
oa. According to the applicants, the dramatic event, which cost the lives of more than 
one thousand people, was attributable to the defendants because they should have no-
ticed – in their capacity as certification companies – that the ship was unable to sail due 
to technical problems. In the applicants’ plea, the sinking was the direct consequence of 
the failure of the certification companies to notice the technical damages/imperfections 
of the Al-Salaam Boccaccio ’98.  
The RINA companies challenged the jurisdiction of the District Court, and more in 
general of Italian courts, because they were acting as delegates of the State of Panama, 
under whose flag the ship was sailing. The plea of jurisdictional immunity of the de-
fendants built on the argument that naval certification and classification activities of 
ships are a manifestation of the flag States’ sovereignty as they correspond to the ful-
filment by those States of certain international law duties. 
The RINA companies more specifically contended that they acted as delegated enti-
ties of the State of Panama for the purposes of complying with the obligation enshrined 
 
2 Opinion of AG Szpunar delivered on 14 January 2020, case C-641/18, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente 
Registro Navale, para. 4. For an early comment on the opinion see P. DE PASQUALE, Immunità degli Stati dalla 
giurisdizione civile e diritto dell’Unione europea: le conclusioni dell’avvocato generale nel caso RINA, in Il diritto 
dell’Unione europea – Osservatorio europeo, 20 February 2020, www.dirittounioneeuropea.eu. 
3 Court of Justice, judgment of 19 July 2012, case C-154/11, Ahmed Mahamdia v. People’s Democratic 
Republic of Algeria. 
4 On the existence of a trend in EU law towards a strict interpretation of State immunity see M. NINO, 
State Immunity from Civil Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes: Evolution in International and National Law and Prac-
tice, in Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale, 2014, p. 845-846. 
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in Art. 94 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which im-
poses on flag States a duty to “effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in adminis-
trative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag”.5 Such a generic legal obli-
gation is complemented by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS Convention), which on one side requires States to strictly abide by a rigid proce-
dure of review of ships sailing under their flags; on the other side, it allows States to en-
trust “recognized organizations” (ROs) with carrying out inspections and surveys.6 
The RINA companies are ROs and in the case at hand acted as ROs on behalf of 
Panama to issue the statutory and class certificates with respect to the shipowner of 
the Al-Salaam Boccaccio ’98.  
The first category of certificate is issued when the ship complies with the technical 
and safety standards enshrined in international conventions such as the SOLAS, which 
should also be incorporated in the flag State legal order.7 Class certificates are granted 
to the shipowner according to the private standard imposed by the RO itself.  
Statutory certificates are troublesome from the perspective of the law of State im-
munity as they are issued by the delegated private RO, which must verify compliance 
with international conventions ratified by the delegating flag State. The complexity of 
the case lies in the dual role of ROs: while they are delegated to fulfil international obli-
gations of the flag State, they also entertain a contractual relationship with the ship-
owner, which pays for the certification.8 
It is precisely this issue that led the District court of Genoa to request the Court of 
Justice a preliminary ruling. The question presented to the Court refers to the interpre-
tation of Arts 1 and 2 of Regulation 44/2001, and in particular to the notion of “civil and 
commercial matters”.9 The applicants before the referring Court argued that an action 
for damages presented against a RO falls within the scope of application of said regula-
tion even if it is performed on behalf of a State, because RO are of a private nature and 
their relationship with the shipowners is a contractual one.  
As anticipated in the introduction, the judgment of the Court of Justice is more far 
reaching and has important and practical international law implications. 
 
5 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, adopted 10 December 1982, entered into force 
16 November 1994, Art. 94. 
6 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), adopted 1st November 1974, entered 
into force 25 May 1980, Chapter I, Regulation 6. 
7 On the duties of flag States see R. BARNES, Flag States, in D. ROTHWELL, A. OUDE ELFERINK, K. SCOTT, T. 
STEPHENS (eds), The Oxford Handbook on the Law of the Sea, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015; J.N.K. 
MANSELL, Flag State Responsibility. Historical Development and Contemporary Issue, Berlin-Heidelberg: 
Springer, 2009.  
8 See broadly N. LAGONI, The Liability of Classification Societies, Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer, 2007, p. 26. 
9 Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and 
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters. 
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This is demonstrated by a ruling delivered by the same District Court (Genoa) as a 
consequence of a “sister” application brought in 2012 by other relatives of the victims of 
the sinking of the Al-Salaam Boccaccio ’98 against the same defendants: the Abdel Naby 
Hussein Mabrouk Aly and Others v. RINA Spa case.10 In that proceeding, the judges of first 
instance decided that RINA companies enjoyed immunity from jurisdiction before Ital-
ian domestic courts. The reasoning of the District Court of Genoa in that judgment well 
exemplifies how the question presented before the Court of Justice might have signifi-
cant practical implications. Indeed, the District Court construed its argumentation and 
reached its conclusions moving from a dogmatic point of view: it acknowledged that a 
correct application in the Italian domestic legal order of the international customary 
rule on State immunity, as defined by the International Court of Justice in the Jurisdic-
tional Immunities case,11 entails an automatic extension of immunity to all activities that 
can be qualified as acta iure imperii even if they are performed by private actors.12 Ac-
cordingly, the District Court did not exercise jurisdiction over RINA Companies and the 
applicants were left without any alternative remedies available.  
Against this background, it appears clear that the legal conundrum lying in the 
background of the question presented to the Court of Justice touch upon several open 
issues in international law that go well beyond the main proceedings. What was at stake 
in the two cases presented before the District Court of Genoa, first, and before the 
Court of Justice, then, is the application of the principles and rules on State immunity to 
private actors that have been delegated the discharge of duties under international law 
by sovereign States. In particular, the core question is whether the mere act of delega-
tion allows regarding the conduct of private actors as covered by the same immunity 
enjoyed by the delegating State. It goes without saying that the practical consequence 
of the answer provided by the Court of Justice relates to the availability of remedies to 
the victims of events similar to the sinking of the Al-Salaam Boccaccio ’98. More in gen-
eral, the case as a whole questions the possibility of private actors acting on behalf of 
the State to shield beyond State immunity when their actions have an impact on the life 
of individuals and on the interrelated right to access to a court and to claim reparation.  
It is not surprising, then, that AG Szpunar, in his opinion, immediately pointed at this 
aspect of the dispute. He recognized that there is a lack of clarity on the scope of the rule 
 
10 District Court of Genoa, judgment no. 8-III-2012 of 8 March 2012, Abdel Naby Hussein Mabrouk Aly 
and Others v. RINA Spa.  
11 Ibid., p. 19 et seq. The District Court of Genoa referred to International Court of Justice, Jurisdiction-
al Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), judgment of 3 February 2012, paras 77, 83-
84, 91. 
12 On this case see I. QUEIROLO, S. DOMINELLI, Statutory certificates e immunità funzionale del registro ital-
iano navale, in Il diritto marittimo, 2013, p. 152 et seq., A. SPAGNOLO, Società private delegate di pubbliche 
funzioni e immunità statale: tendenze e problemi, in Questione giustizia, 28 December 2015, 
www.questionegiustizia.it. 
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on State immunity, and in particular on the difficulty of distinguishing between acta iure 
imperii and acta iure gestionis, when States’ action is “to some degree privatised”.13 As we 
will see in the next section, the answer to this question relies on a complex reasoning. 
III. The AG Opinion and the Court of Justice’s judgment 
The methodology chosen by the AG reflects the need to offer an answer to the question 
presented by the referring court through a two-step analysis. Interestingly, while ac-
knowledging that the EU is “bound to observe international law in its entirety, including 
customary international law”,14 the AG stated “there is nothing to prevent the legislature 
from adopting rules of jurisdiction that apply ratione materiae to disputes in which one 
of the parties may rely on immunity from jurisdiction”.15 Against this, the AG decided to 
disregard any equivalence between the scope of application of Regulation 44/2001 and 
the negative scope of jurisdictional immunity.16  
As a result, the AG distinguished between the analysis of the scope of said regula-
tion, namely, the notion of “civil and commercial matters”, and the effect of the custom-
ary rule on State immunity on the application of the same regulation in the concrete 
case at hand. Consequently, he affirmed that to perform the first step of the analysis 
the Court of Justice should adopt criteria autonomous from international law.17 Accord-
ingly, the discussion on immunity must necessarily follow and should be oriented to 
understand if domestic courts are in concreto barred from exercising their jurisdiction. 
iii.1. The scope of application of Regulation 44/2001 from the viewpoint 
of public international law 
As regards the first step of his analysis, it is worth noting here that the AG concluded 
that, in the light of the case law of the Court of Justice “the mere fact that the defend-
ants carried out the acts at issue upon delegation from a State does not in itself mean 
that the dispute in which liability for those acts is alleged falls outside the scope ratione 
materiae of Regulation No 44/2001”,18 because the operations performed by RINA 
Companies “cannot be regarded as proceeding from the exercise of public powers”.19 
Therefore, in principle, an action for damages brought against a private actors falls 
 
13 Opinion of AG Szpunar, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., para. 37.  
14 Ibid., para. 40. 
15 Ibid., para. 41. 
16 Ibid., paras 42 and 45. 
17 Ibid., para. 46. 
18 Ibid., para. 99. 
19 Ibid., para. 100. 
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within the concept of “civil and commercial matters” even if those actors act upon dele-
gation by a sovereign State.20 
With regard to the first step of the analysis of AG Szpunar, the Court of Justice up-
held his Opinion. In particular, it is interesting to highlight the passages of both the AG 
Opinion and the Court’s judgment in which that abstract finding is applied to the dis-
pute, which unavoidably regards international law issues.  
In essence, the AG opined and the Court confirmed that the conduct of RINA Com-
panies must be considered of a “technical nature”, and, accordingly, they cannot be 
considered as performed in the exercise of public powers.21 In that respect, the ele-
ments considered by both the AG and the Court of Justice were essentially linked to the 
role of RO such as the RINA Companies, which are simply required, through a commer-
cial contract, to apply the pre-defined legislation. Moreover, the Court noted, in accord-
ance with the AG, that if “a ship is no longer able to sail, that is because of the sanction 
which as the Rina companies admitted at the hearing, is imposed by law”.22 Indeed, the 
Court also recognized that even according to international law, in particular the SOLAS 
Convention, the task of the RO is limited to notify the authorities of the delegating 
States, which remain responsible for authorizing the use of its flag.23 
iii.2. The immunity issue 
Having clarified that the dispute falls within the scope of Regulation 44/2001, the AG and 
the Court of Justice addressed the potential impact of State immunity on the exercise of 
jurisdiction by domestic courts in concreto. In this regard, the AG Opinion and the Court’s 
judgment present some differences, therefore they will be addressed separately. 
The AG findings, in particular, are interesting from the perspective of international 
law because they offer an interpretation of the customary international rules on im-
munity. They build on the assumption that on the basis of the sources available it is im-
possible to conclude that there exists a precise customary or treaty rule that extends 
States’ immunity to entities legally separated from States.24 As an evidence of this as-
sumption, the AG recalled Art. 2 of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Im-
munities of States and their Property (New York Convention), which extends the notion 
of “State” to “agencies or instrumentalities of the State or other entities, to the extent 
that they are entitled to perform and are actually performing acts in the exercise of 
sovereign authority of the State”.25 
 
20 Ibid., para. 101. 
21 Ibid., paras 90-98, in partic. para. 94; LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., paras 43-47. 
22 LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., para. 47. 
23 Ibid., para. 48. 
24 Opinion of AG Szpunar, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., paras 109-110. 
25 Ibid., para. 114. See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their 
Property, adopted 2 December 2004, not yet in force, Art. 2. 
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It appears from the words of the AG that the condition posed by the New York Con-
vention to the extension of State immunity to delegated private entities implies that no 
specific rule applies to the latter subjects. Against this, the whole analysis of the AG 
concerns the interpretation of the scope of the rule on State immunity.26 
In the performance of his hermeneutic task, the AG moved to interpret one of the 
most contentious issue before Italian domestic Courts between the applicants and the 
defendants in both cases concerning the sinking of the Al-Salaam Boccaccio ’98: recital 
no. 16 of Directive 2009/15, which states that “When a recognised organisation, its in-
spectors, or its technical staff issue the relevant certificates on behalf of the administra-
tion, Member States should consider enabling them, as regards these delegated activi-
ties, to be subject to proportionate legal safeguards and judicial protection, including 
the exercise of appropriate rights of defence, apart from immunity, which is a preroga-
tive that can only be invoked by Member States as an inseparable right of sovereignty 
and therefore that cannot be delegated”.27 
The main contention regarding that recital concerned its role in the interpretation 
of the rule on State immunity. According to the applicants before the District Court of 
Genoa it demonstrates that State immunity does not extend to ROs, while the defend-
ants pleaded to the contrary on the ground that the recital, which has no binding force 
and is applicable only to EU Member States could not have been used as evidence of 
practice or opinion juris to interpret the rule on immunity. 
The AG Opinion tackled firstly this last argument. In this regard, the steps of the 
analysis that deserve to be mentioned relate more broadly to the ability of the EU to 
provide an interpretation of customary international law having recourse to its own 
practice (namely: recital no. 16). Building on the assumption that the practice of interna-
tional organizations might contribute to the formation or to the expression of a cus-
tomary rule if the matters fall within that organization mandate, the AG opined that the 
EU has authority to interpret the immunity rule due to the adoption of Directive 
2009/15, which brought under EU competences the implementation of international law 
obligations related to maritime security and in particular the rule that regulate the rela-
tionship between Member States and ROs.28 Furthermore, and interestingly, the AG 
stressed that the interpretive role of the Court of Justice is not limited to EU Member 
States because courts and jurisdictions of any State are not prevented “from contrib-
uting to the formation or expression of customary international law, which, leaving 
aside regional customs, must be consistent globally and contain no notable contradic-
 
26 Opinion of AG Szpunar, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., para. 104. 
27 Recital no. 16 of Directive 2009/15/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 
2009 on common rules and standards for ship inspection and survey organisations and for the relevant 
activities of maritime administrations. 
28 Opinion of AG Szpunar, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., paras 123-124. 
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tions”.29 To sum up, the AG asserted with great clarity the role of the Court f Justice in 
the development of customary international law. 
Following this line of reasoning and moving to the substance of the rule, the AG con-
sidered recital no 16 as an evidence of the non-extension to private actors of the State 
immunity rule. In developing this argument, the AG made recourse to the findings on the 
scope of Regulation 44/2001, revealing, therefore, an unavoidable connection between 
the two steps of his analysis. Indeed, the exclusion of immunity set forth in recital no 16 is 
coherent with the non-classification of Rina Companies’ conducts as acta iure imperii for 
the purposes of Regulation 44/2001, which is derived from the Court of Justice’s jurispru-
dence. Interestingly, the two steps of the analysis found a point of juncture here, where 
the AG presented and asserted the position of the EU on the interpretation of the cus-
tomary rule on States’ immunity when the position of ROs is considered.30 
Although, as I wrote before, the judgment of the Court of Justice is nothing but a 
remand to the AG’s Opinion, it is worth recalling how the Court stressed the importance 
of recital no 16, which “bears out the EU legislature’s intention to give a limited scope to 
its interpretation of the customary international law principle of immunity from jurisdic-
tion with regard to classification and certification of ships”.31 
The last point addressed by the AG regards the balancing between the immunity 
rule and the right to access to a court, enshrined both in Art. 47 of the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union and in Art. 6 of the European Convention of 
Human Rights (ECHR). In that respect, the findings of the AG and those of the Court of 
Justice are slightly different. The AG, after having stressed the legal obligation of domes-
tic courts to take into account the right to access to a court, concluded that in the main 
proceedings such a right has not been violated due to the fact that the relatives of the 
victims could have brought a claim before Panama’s jurisdictions.32 The Court of Justice 
was more cautious and simply affirmed that  
“a national court implementing EU law in applying Regulation No 44/2001 must comply 
with the requirements flowing from Article 47 of the Charter […]. Consequently, in the 
present case, the referring court must satisfy itself that, if it upheld the plea relating to 
immunity from jurisdiction, LG and Others would not be deprived of their right of access 
to the courts, which is one of the elements of the right to effective judicial protection in 
Article 47 of the Charter”. 
 
29 Ibid., para. 125. 
30 Ibid., para. 127: “Regardless of the nature of the interpretation of customary international law that 
one may identify in recital 16 of Directive 2009/15, that recital is not an incidental expression of the posi-
tion adopted by the European Union with regard to the characterisation of classification and certification 
operations carried out by a private-law body as operations which do not proceed from the exercise of 
public powers” (emphasis added). 
31 LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., para. 59. 
32 Opinion of AG Szpunar, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., para. 153. 
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Despite this difference, it clearly emerges from both the AG’s Opinion and the Court 
judgment that the State immunity rule is no longer impermeable to the influence of 
human rights and this is not only limited to cases where international crimes are com-
mitted. This last argument will be developed in the concluding section of this Insight. 
IV. The impact of the RINA Case on public international law 
The judgment of the Court of Justice, read in the light of AG’s Spzunar opinion, might 
have significant implications for the evolution of the law on State immunity. The present 
section of this Insight aims at investigating two issues that emerge from the above anal-
ysis: 1) the methodology that lead to the identification of the customary rule on State 
immunity; 2) the scope of that rule, in particular when the conduct of private actors and 
the distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure gestionis are concerned. 
iv.1. The methodology that lead to the identification of the customary 
rule on State immunity 
As seen in sub-section III.2 AG Spzunar performed an inquiry into the legal value of re-
cital no. 16 of Directive 2009/15 and its contribution to the formation, identification and 
subsequent application on the customary rule on State immunity. 
The position of the AG on the suitability of that recital to be considered akin to 
“practice” of an international organization and/or opinio juris needs to be put in the con-
text of the broader debate on the role of international organizations for the purposes of 
the identification of customary international law. 
It is generally accepted that international organizations, as international law sub-
jects, can contribute to the identification of customary rules;33 this is also acknowledged 
in the draft conclusions of the International Law Commission (ILC) on this topic.34 
Precisely, the ILC included a reference to the practice of international organizations 
in the commentary to draft conclusion no. 4 as one of the “requirements of practice”. 
Para. 2 of that conclusion postulates that “In certain cases, the practice of international 
organizations also contributes to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary 
international law”.35 In the commentary to the paragraph just mentioned, the ILC speci-
 
33 See ex multis T. TREVES, Customary law, in R. WOLFRUM (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
2012, para. 51. See also International Law Association, Committee on the formation of customary interna-
tional law, Final report of the Committee, Statement of principles applicable to the formation of customary 
international law, 2000, p. 9, www.ila-hq.org.  
34 International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions on identification of customary international law, 
UN Doc. A/73/10, para. 65. See accordingly N. BLOKKER, International Organizations and Customary Interna-
tional Law. Is the International Law Commission Taking International Organizations Seriously?, in International 
Organizations Law Review, 2017, p. 4. 
35 International Law Commission, Draft Conclusions on identification of customary international law, 
cit., Conclusion 4, para. 2. 
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fies that the expression “in certain cases” applies “where member States have trans-
ferred exclusive competences to the international organization, so that the latter exer-
cises some of the public powers of its member States and hence the practice of the or-
ganization may be equated with the practice of those States”.36 The EU clearly falls into 
this category, as the same commentary punctually observes.37 
This notwithstanding, the ILC codification effort does not clarify what the meaning 
of “practice of international organizations” is. This appears to be in line with the whole 
approach of the ILC toward the role of international organizations in the identification 
of customary international law. Whereas four draft conclusions – from 5 to 8 – explain 
the forms and the characteristics that States’ practice may assume, there are no similar 
indications with regard to the practice of international organizations.38  
To understand this expression it is useful to read the Third Report presented by the 
Special Rapporteur, Sir Michael Wood, where he limited the relevant practice of interna-
tional organizations to the so-called “external practice”, namely the “conduct of the organ-
ization in its relations with States, international organizations and others”.39 It was mainly 
the EU to criticize the approach followed by the Special Rapporteur. According to the rep-
resentative of the European Commission at the UN General Assembly 6th Committee, the 
ILC should have stated clearly that all the draft conclusions related to States’ practice 
should apply mutatis mutandis, to the conduct of an international organization in so far as 
the organization exercised its executive, legislative, judicial or other functions on the basis 
of competences conferred on it by its member States in a founding treaty.40 
Although it is clear that the EU represents an unicum in the panorama of interna-
tional organizations,41 the comment provided by the Commission on the codification 
work of the ILC is reasonable insofar as it acknowledged that the ILC fell short of catch-
ing the whole range of possibilities through which the EU might contribute to the identi-
fication of customary international law.42  
Against this background, it is easier to understand the importance of AG Spzunar’s 
Opinion in the part in which he considered recital 16 of Directive 2009/15 as an element of 
the practice of international organization. Indeed, recital 16 could hardly be regarded as 
 
36 Ibid., Commentary, para. 6. 
37 Ibid. 
38 See again N. BLOKKER, International Organizations and Customary International Law, cit., pp. 7-8. 
39 Third report on identification of customary international law by Michael Wood, Special Rapporteur, 
UN Doc. A/CN.4/682 of 27 March 2015, para. 72. 
40 United Nations General Assembly, 6th Committee, Summary record of the 19th meeting, UN Doc. 
A/C.6/70/SR.19 of 20 November 2015, para. 86. 
41 See accordingly S.D. MURPHY, Identification of Customary International Law and Other Topics: The Six-
ty-Seventh Session of the International Law Commission, in American Journal of International Law, 2017, p. 
825. 
42 J. ODERMATT, The Development of Customary International Law by International Organizations, in Inter-
national and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2017, p. 501. 
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“external practice” in the meaning offered by the Special Rapporteur in his Third Report be-
cause it is part of a legislative act of the EU applicable in the relation with Member States. 
However, both the directive and the recital are also hardly conceivable as deprived 
of any external effects. On one side, Directive 2009/15 “establishes measures to be fol-
lowed by the Member States in their relationship with organisations entrusted with the 
inspection, survey and certification of ships for compliance with the international conven-
tions on safety at sea and prevention of marine pollution”,43 which means that the Di-
rective implements all the international conventions related to maritime security re-
ferred to in section II of this Insight and it ultimately represents the exercise by the 
(then) EC of its competence, which undoubtedly has external implications. On the other 
side, recital no. 16, despite its non-binding nature, sets forth the position of the EU as 
far as the recognition of immunity to RO is concerned, therefore it inevitably impacts on 
the law on State immunity, thus having an external impact. 
Although the AG bluntly regarded recital no. 16 as practice of the organizations akin 
to the definition provided by the ILC without further elaborating on its suitability, his 
opinion and the specific case at hand demonstrate that the critics to the ILC’s narrow 
approach to the “practice of international organizations” were well-founded, in particu-
lar when the practice of the EU is considered. If one considers the whole range of com-
petences conferred by Member States to the EU and the external effects that the exer-
cise of those competence implies, in particular when they implement and supplement 
obligations imposed by international law, it appears that there are no reasons to adopt 
a formalistic approach to the “external practice of international organizations”.44  
In broader terms, the RINA case will inevitably contribute to fuel the debate on the 
role of international organizations as such – and not as catalysts of States’ practice – in 
the formation of customary international law. Under this perspective, the judgement of 
the Court of Justice might contribute to the development of international law as it rep-
resents one of the fewest – if not the only – case in which practice of international or-
ganizations was scrutinized by an international court.45 
 
43 Directive 2009/15, cit., Art. 1. 
44 On the complexity of the EU as an actor in the international arena see E. CANNIZZARO, Fragmented 
Sovereignty? The European Union and its Member States in the International Arena, in The Italian Yearbook of 
International Law, 2003, p. 35 et seq. 
45 S.D. MURPHY, Identification of Customary International Law and Other Topics, cit., p. 824, and J. 
ODERMATT, The Development of Customary International Law by International Organizations, cit., p. 500 noted 
that the approach of the ILC was probably influenced by the lack of judicial practice that could have 
helped to define the ‘practice of international organizations.’ On the potential of the Court of Justice to 
contribute to international law-making see F. CASOLARI, L’incorporazione del diritto internazionale nel diritto 
dell’Unione europea, Milano: Giuffrè, 2008, p. 84-108 and p. 165; see also A. GIANELLI, Unione Europa e diritto 
internazionale consuetudinario, Torino: Giappichelli, 2004, p. 119 et seq. 
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iv.2. The scope of that rule, in particular when the conduct of private 
actors and the distinction between acta iure imperii and acta iure 
gestionis are concerned 
The second issue that deserves close attention from the standpoint of international law 
is the classification of an act as an expression of the sovereign authority of a State for 
the purposes of defining the scope of application of the rule on State immunity. In this 
regard, one may argue whether the Court of Justice’s judgment and the AG Spzunar’s 
opinion reflect the current state of the art in the international law of State immunity or 
contribute to its development.  
In this respect, AG Spzunar’s applies to the case at hand the law on State immunity 
disregarding the doctrine of functional immunity, which the District Court of Genoa up-
held in the already mentioned judgment in the Abdel Naby Hussein Mabrouk Aly and Oth-
ers v. RINA Spa case.46 This approach appears in line with international law: Art. 2 of the 
New York Convention employs the term State to refer also to “other entities”, which in-
clude private ones;47 moreover, the doctrine of functional immunity commonly applies 
to individual persons who are State organs and normally entails immunity from individ-
ual criminal jurisdiction.48 
Moving to the substance of State immunity, it is necessary to recall that the com-
mentary to Art. 2 clearly states that private entities are immune from the jurisdiction of 
foreign States “only to the extent that they are entitled to perform acts in the exercise of 
prerogative de la puissance publique”49and that the same private entities thus “are pre-
sumed not to be entitled to perform governmental functions, and accordingly, as a rule, 
are not entitled to invoke immunity from jurisdiction of the courts of another State”.50 
The New York Convention, therefore, seems to indicate that a presumption exists in 
favor of the non-automatic extension of State immunity to private entities. It is worth 
noting that such a presumption reflects the drafting history of Art. 2: in a first draft of 
the rule, the term “other entities” did not appear as it was introduced at a later stage to 
 
46 See supra, Section II. In particular, see District Court of Genoa, cit., p. 31. 
47 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, cit., Art. 2, 
para. 1, let. b), sub-let. iv).  
48 See accordingly I. QUEIROLO, S. DOMINELLI, Statutory certificates e immunità funzionale del registro ital-
iano navale, cit., p. 164; A. SPAGNOLO, Società private delegate di pubbliche funzioni e immunità statale, cit., p. 
7. But see contra P. DE PASQUALE, La sentenza della Corte di giustizia nel caso RINA: ancora sull’immunità degli 
Stati dalla giurisdizione civile, in Il diritto dell’Unione europea. Osservatorio europeo, 28 May 2020, p. 8, 
www.dirittounioneeuropea.eu; M. BORREANI, Tutela internazionale delle funzioni sovrane delegate ad enti 
stranieri: tra vecchie e nuove aporie, in Il diritto del commercio internazionale, 2018, p. 748 et seq. 
49 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, cit., Com-
mentary to Art. 2, para. 1, let. b), sub-let. iv), para. 14.  
50 Ibid., para. 15. 
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cover specific situations such as commercial banks entrusted by sovereign States with 
import-export licensing powers.51  
The presumption of non-application of State immunity to private entities is also pre-
sent in UK legislation, while US legislation adopts the opposite approach.52 Domestic judi-
cial practice of States that do not adopt the “list method” seems to confirm that once it is 
established that an act is attributable to an entity separated from the State it is necessary 
to inquire into the quality of the act itself to ascertain if immunity should be granted.53  
The approach of the AG and of the Court of Justice appears therefore to be in line 
with the New York Convention and finds confirmation in the vast majority of domestic 
judicial and statutory practice. The Court of Justice simply re-affirmed the principle that 
when private entities are entrusted by States to perform public duties, it is on them to 
demonstrate that they are exercising sovereign powers. 
This finding of the Court of Justice however does not yet solve the final, but funda-
mental, issue, namely the characterization of the wrongdoing of RINA Companies as a 
manifestation of sovereign powers of the State of Panama.  
Leaving aside for a moment the delegation of powers to private entities, in general 
terms it is far from easy to draw a line in the sand to distinguish between the State act-
ing as a private person and the State acting in the exercise of its sovereign powers, in 
particular when it comes to define the elements that a domestic court should take into 
account to affirm or to deny its jurisdiction.54  
The New York Convention excludes the application of State immunity when States are 
engaged in commercial transactions, but even this assertion does not reveal much on the 
scope of the rule.55 During the negotiations of the Convention, many States defended the 
idea that some commercial transactions are performed for public purposes and therefore 
must not be subject to the judgment of a foreign court;56 while others – Italy included – 
argued that a more objective approach, based on the nature of the act, would have been 
 
51 Ibid. See accordingly T. GRANT, Commentary to Article 2(1)(a) and (b), in R. O’KEEFE, C.J. TAMS (eds), The 
United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their Properties, A Commentary, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 41; H. FOX, P. WEBB, The Law of State Immunity, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013, p. 292. 
52 X. YANG, State immunity in international law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p. 232 et 
seq. 
53 An analysis of the jurisprudence can be found in X. YANG, ibid., p. 230-296. A recent discussion on 
this jurisprudence can be found in A. ODDENINO, D. BONETTO, The Issue of Immunity of Private Actors Exercis-
ing Public Authority and the New Paradigm of International Law, in Global Jurist, 2020, p. 4-6. 
54 See accordingly J. FINKE, Sovereign immunity: Rule, comity or something else?, in European Journal of 
International Law, 2010, p. 859. 
55 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, cit., Art. 10. 
56 International Law Commission, Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property. Comments 
and Observations Received from Governments, UN Doc. A/CN.4/410 and Add 1-5, YILC, 1988, Vol. II, Part 
One, p. 45 et seq. 
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preferable.57 The fierce debate among States probably explains why the New York Con-
vention proposes a two-pronged approach in defining a commercial transaction. Accord-
ingly, a court must first look at the nature of an act but can also rely on its purpose, as a 
subsidiary means.58 Indeed, while the “nature test” is surely the prevalent one in domestic 
jurisprudence, it was noted that the “purpose test” has not at all vanished.59 
Things get more complicated where disputes concern so-called ‘mixed-activities’ of 
States, namely activities that are composed of private and public acts, which usually 
happens in the field of investments. Here again an analysis of domestic jurisprudence 
reveals that the “nature test” is the main point of departure of the analysis of domestic 
courts and that courts tend to rely on the original relationship between the plaintiff and 
the respondent State.60  
Turning back to the RINA case and to peculiarities of the main proceedings, it is 
necessary to highlight and to stress that the original domestic dispute – and also the 
above-mentioned “sister” cases – did not involve any third State, namely the State of 
Panama was not involved in the dispute. This means that the original dispute is one be-
tween private persons. 
Therefore, in cases such as RINA, it is not about demonstrating that a State is acting as 
a private person; it is about proving that a private entity is acting like a State. Consequently, 
it is reasonable to opine that if the “nature test” is the preferable one to be adopted to de-
termine if an act is iure imperii or iure privatorum when States are part to a dispute, then it 
should be the preferable one also when the dispute involves only private actors.  
In light of this, the reasoning and the findings of the Court of Justice – the AG’s Opin-
ion included – simply follows a logical path: once it is proven that under customary in-
ternational law ROs are not entitled to sovereign immunity and, accordingly, a pre-
sumption of non-application of State immunity exists, then the nature of the legal rela-
tionship between the parties of the dispute must be scrutinized to determine if the act 
is nonetheless iure imperii. 
In this regard, it was already stressed that ROs have a dual role as they perform flag 
States’ duties and entertain a contractual relationship with the shipowner at the same 
time.61 The Court of Justice, building on the AG’s Opinion, gave relevance to the latter 
 
57 Ibid., p. 73, para. 5. 
58 United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, cit., com-
mentary to Art. 2, para. 26. 
59 See accordingly H. FOX, P. WEBB, The Law of State immunity, cit., p. 292; X. YANG, State immunity in in-
ternational law, cit., p. 108 
60 For a review of jurisprudence see B.I. BONAFÈ, State Immunity And The Protection Of Private Investors: 
The Argentine Bonds Case Before Italian Courts, in The Italian Yearbook of International Law, 2006, p. 170 et 
seq.; see also E.K. BANKAS, The State Immunity Controversy in International Law, Berlin-Heidelberg, Springer, 
2005, p. 224-230. 
61 See supra, section II. 
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relationship, thus endorsing once again the “nature test” in the application of the State 
immunity role.  
In the case at hand, the Court also explained that such a relationship is purely pri-
vate as RINA Companies were simply tasked to perform technical inspections and sur-
veys under remuneration from the shipowner. Under this perspective, the Court of Jus-
tice also contributes to clarify the scope of the relationship between the flag State and 
the RO in the performance of the duties arising out of Art. 94 of the UNCLOS. Indeed, 
when the Court and the AG affirm that RO only performs technical duties, they seem to 
rely on a narrow interpretation of Regulation 6 of Chapter I of the SOLAS, which indi-
cates that flag States are not allowed to delegate to RO all their duties, but only those 
related to inspection and surveys as they must retain the responsibility related to the 
exercise of jurisdiction and control over the ship and ultimately to the use of the flag.62  
To sum up, ROs cannot claim immunity from jurisdiction for their wrongdoings be-
cause their actions or inactions do not represent exercise of sovereign authority of the 
flag States, but only a technical portion of a process that leads to the decision of those 
States to concede to a shipowner to sail under its flag. 
In this respect, it must not be underestimated that the State of Panama could even 
argue that it could not be held responsible for the specific conducts of RINA Companies 
because in the agreement signed in 1999, the ROs were simply tasked with technical 
duties, while the Government retained any decision regarding the applicable standard 
and the final concession of the flag.63 Interestingly, such an interpretation by the State 
of Panama would be in line with the commentary to Art. 5 of the Articles on the respon-
sibility of States for internationally wrongful act, which calls for a narrow interpretation 
of “governmental authority”.64  
In light of this, the judgment of the Court on this point is a bold statement that 
might help to prevent that the delegation of responsibilities from the flag States to the 
RO ends up in avoiding responsibility under international law.65 
V. Concluding remarks 
As seen in this Insight the RINA case indicates that exists a trend towards limiting 
the scope of application of State immunity which seems to be evolving in the jurispru-
dence of the Court of Justice.  
The judgment of the Court of Justice follows the already mentioned preliminary rul-
ing in the Mahamdia v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria (Mahamdia case) case, 
 
62 See accordingly J.N.K. MANSELL, Flag State Responsibility, cit., p. 182-183.  
63 Opinion of AG Szpunar, LG and Others v. Rina and Ente Registro Navale, cit., para. 94. 
64 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts of 3 August 2001, UN Doc. A/56/10, commentary to Art. 5, para. 7. 
65 J.N.K. MANSELL, Flag State Responsibility, cit., p. 183.  
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where the Court ruled that the respondent State in the main proceedings did not enjoy 
immunity from jurisdiction in a contractual dispute concerning an employee of the Al-
gerian embassy in Berlin to the extent that “the functions carried out by the employee 
do not fall within the exercise of public powers”.66  
The interest of Mahamdia case lies in the opinion delivered by AG Mengozzi, who af-
firmed, in broader terms that 
“The modern State has become a polymorphous actor in law and may act and enter into 
legal relations without, however, exercising its sovereignty or its public authority in doing 
so: I am thinking in particular of the State as a trader, but also, of course, the State as an 
employer. Because these different facets of the State’s legal activity are not systematical-
ly accompanied by the exercise of powers as a public authority, they tend no longer to 
justify the automatic recognition of immunity from jurisdiction”.67 
Both the judgment of the Court of Justice and AG’s Opinion in the RINA case go pre-
cisely in the direction indicated by AG Mengozzi and even a step further. 
In fact, whereas the Mahamdia case was limited to define the scope of State immun-
ity in labour-related disputes,68 the preliminary ruling in the RINA case has a broader 
reach in that it states clearly that private actors do not enjoy automatic immunity simply 
because they are delegated by States to perform international obligations.69 According-
ly, the Court of Justice is sending a message to domestic courts to perform a deeper 
scrutiny into the nature of the activities of private actors, in order to avoid that immuni-
ty “destroys any legal action”.70 
The confirmation of such a trend towards a strict interpretation on the law on State 
immunity might contribute to the evolution of international law in subiecta materia, es-
pecially if one considers the argument of AG’s Spzunar that EU practice as such can con-
tribute to the identification of customary international law.71 In this perspective, the 
RINA case goes well beyond the identification of the limits to the application of interna-
 
66 Ahmed Mahamdia v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, cit., para. 57. 
67 Opinion of AG Mengozzi delivered on 24 May 2012, case C-154/11, Ahmed Mahamdia v. People’s 
Democratic Republic of Algeria, para. 21. 
68 On the importance of the Mahamdia case see M. NINO, State Immunity from Civil Jurisdiction in Labor 
Disputes, cit., pp. 838-846; R. GARNETT, State and Diplomatic Immunity and Employment Rights: European Law 
to the Rescue?, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2015, p. 814-815; P. WEBB, The Immunity of 
States, Diplomats and International Organizations in Employment Disputes: The New Human Rights Dilemma?, 
in European Journal of International Law, 2016, p. 754. 
69 See supra, section IV, sub-section IV.2. 
70 Opinion of AG Mengozzi, Ahmed Mahamdia v. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, cit., para. 22. 
71 See supra, section IV, sub-section IV.1.  
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tional law into the EU legal order,72 and might help identifying the criteria for the appli-
cation of the customary law on State immunity in general. 
By way of conclusion, it is important not to forget the impact that the preliminary 
ruling might have before the referring court in Genoa. Before the judgment of the 
Court, the relatives of the victims were bounced between the responsibility of the flag 
State and that of the RINA companies. After the ruling, at least they know that they can 
have access to a remedy before the court of the legal seat of the RO which performed 
the inspection of the ship. 
 
72 As suggested by M. NINO (State Immunity from Civil Jurisdiction in Labor Disputes, cit., p. 846) with re-
gard to the Mahamdia case. 
